Postmetaphysical Thinking (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought) [ Jürgen Habermas, William Mark Hohengarten] on *FREE*. It is hard to think of a contemporary philosopher whose achievement rivals that of Jürgen Habermas, in terms of range, comprehensiveness and. Postmetaphysical thinking reflects an acceptance of principled critiques of earlier, more metaphysi- cal approaches to philosophical questions. For Habermas.
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Postmetaphysical Thinking II | Social Philosophy | General Philosophy | Subjects | Wiley
Postmetaphysical thinking is, in the first place, the historical answer to the crisis of metaphysics following Hegel, when the central metaphysical figures of thought began to totter under the pressure exerted by social developments and by developments within science. For him, the human life-world is constituted and interpreted by means of a repertoire of concepts incommensurable with those of the natural sciences. postmetaohysical
Cited translations from German have sometimes been modified. Hence, up until the publication of Haabermas and Human Interests in the late s, he conceived of critical social theory as helping members of modern societies to become aware of and capable of overcoming the unperceived constraints and ideological rigidities which prevent them from collectively shaping the social order they inhabit.
Thomas McCarthy, Cambridge Habermas draws heavily on Mead to develop a theory of social interaction that is not dependent upon idealist notions of the self positing of the ego which, upto Fichte, depended upon the I as the original source of consciousness.
Part II is concerned with the venerable question of the relation between faith and knowledge; with his habitual intellectual generosity, Habermas offers extensive, thoughtful and learned responses to the papers which were presented by theologians and philosophers of religion at two conferences devoted to his work, in New York and Vienna. It covers a rich variety of topics, honing in particularly on the meaning of religion in public life.
What balance sheet can we draw up of his tackling of these issues, on the evidence of the current volume?
Request an Evaluation Copy for this title. Legitimation Crisis73 But now this problem becomes much more central to his thinking. Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge Such a conflation, Apel argued, is dangerous, because it encourages the belief that reflective political engagement in a risk-laden concrete situation could itself have the status of a kind of science. His writings have dealt with the philosophy of language and communication, the basis of moral consciousness, the philosophy of history and the evolution of social life since the dawn of human time, sociological theory on the grand scale, political philosophy and legal theory, and — increasingly — the philosophy of religion.
It renounces as outdated any philosophical vision of the world imbued with substantive values. This possibility is not available when epistemic issues are mixed up with normative and evaluative ones, as was standardly the case in the pre-modern world.
Soft naturalists typically argue that the human world of meaning, mentation and responsible agency, and the world viewed as a causal nexus of physical processes are not in conflict with one another.
Habermas’s Postmetaphysical thinking
Habermas argues that a distinctively human form of social life first emerged when action-coordination became dependent on the communicative forging of a shared perspective on objects in the world — a feat of which higher primates, despite their intelligence and ability to use signals, are not capable. A Symposium on Faith and Knowledge: In the domain of moral philosophy, the enormous task he set himself was nonchalantly expressed on the back cover of the English translation of his Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action According to him, this enterprise is no longer plausible, because philosophy must also bow to the separation of validity spheres, and conceive of itself either as collaborative Wissenschaftseeking universal structures underpinning human capabilities, or merely as the reflexive illumination of a particular socio-cultural world.
Habermas is all too aware that he may simply be inviting metaphysics in through the back door.
He conceives of this balancing act yhinking dependent on a reciprocal learning process, in which religious believers come to acknowledge the legitimacy of other faiths, the epistemic standing of modern postmetaaphysical, and the principles of the liberal democratic order from which they too benefit, while non-believers treat their religious fellow citizens without condescension, and even remain open to insights which may be encapsulated in the language of a faith they do not share.
At the same time, according to Habermas, elected legislators, judges, and other public officials, are under an obligation to frame their decisions in a neutral, secular language, in order that their reasons be accessible to all citizens.
It needs this connection in order to make up for what it has renounced by insisting on their separation. In the second section, the uneasy relationship between religion and postmetaphysical tbinking takes centre stage.
The New Philosophical Interest in Religion. In short, it would fail adequately to respect the distinction between fides quae creditur and fides qua creditur — between articles of belief and a lived faith.
Many soft naturalists are happy to leave it at that, indifferent to the objection that perspectives that expect to be taken seriously imply hhinking commitments. The final section includes essays on the role of religion in the political context of a post-secular, liberal society.
In the final part, Postmetaphyaical explores the implications for democratic politics of this acknowledgement of the enduring roots of religion postmetzphysical the basic dynamics of human sociality. In developing Mead’s idea of the social ego Habermas puts forward that consciousness is not a originary act of the ego, but an external force that encroaches inwardly and forms the ego within a set of responses to stimuli from the other, wherein the I through being refered to by another can gain knowledge of himself in seeing how a second actor organises his interlocutionary demands.
After more than sixty years of intellectual endeavour, Habermas has accumulated an oeuvre which not only stands in the tradition of the great systematic social thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century — Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Weber — but can claim a dignified place beside postmetaaphysical.
Our religious traditions, he suggests, still resonate in the semantic depths of our fundamental moral and ethical concepts — even in the anemic versions of them traded by professional philosophers. Hence both Kierkegaard and Marx are seen as paths away from this type of thought and stepping stones on the way to functional sociologies and psychologies that set in motion the procedures of communication theory. But then it finds itself intimately linked to extra-philosophical sources of meaning — pre-eminently religion — that are characterized by a fusion of validity spheres.
As might be inferred from what I have said so far, from the late s onwards Habermas began to worry more and more that a Vernunftmoral in the lineage of Kant — such as he takes his own discourse ethics to be — pays for its secular universalism with a lack of inspiring and motivational power.
From Worldviews to the Lifeworld 2. Postmetaphysical thinking appears to coincide with the movement away from metaphysical philosophies of reflection of which Hegel is understood to be the final innovator.